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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE

OF UTAH

PEOPLES FINANCE & THRIFT
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY,
A Utah Corporation,

Plaintiff-Respondent.

No. 10106

vs.
WAYNE T. BLOMQUIST,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Action by Industrial Loan Corporation on note. Defense of usury because of provision for attorney fees in
note.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Court ruled note was not usurious and granted judgment in favor of plaintiff.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or failing that, a
new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, a Utah Industrial Loan Corporation, brought
this action to collect the unpaid balance of a loan plus
interest, costs and attorney fees. The parties stipulated
that the sole issues raised by the pleadings which are
material herein is whether or not an industrial loan company may contract for and recover reasonable attorneys
fees in the event of default in payment by borrower,
(R. 13-14)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PROVISION FOR ATTORNEY FEES IN INDUSTRIAL LOAN RENDERS TRANSACTION USURIOUS.
The loan in issue in this matter was made by Plaintiff,
a Utah Industrial Loan Corporation which is licensed
under the provisions of Title 7, Chapter 8, UCA, 1953.
The loan provides for payment by defendant of a reasonable attorneys fees in the event of default. (R. 3). The
parties have stipulated that the sole issue before the
Court is "whether an industrial loan corporation may
contract for and recover reasonable attorneys fees in the
event of default upon a note and chattel mortgage by
borrower". ( R. 13, Par 1 (a).
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The Industrial Loan Law of the State of Utah is, in
effect, a Usury law designed and enacted to protect those
whom necessity compels to borrow from outrageous demands oftentimes made and required by those who have
money to loan. That Industrial Loan Law is an exception
to regular interest rates and that law permits plaintiff to
charge interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month on the
original balance of the loan, to add the interest to the loan
and to require repayment of the loan in installments,
Seaboard Finance Co., v. Wahlen, 123 U. 529, 260 P. 2d
~53. 557. thus yielding an effective rate of interest to
plaintiff of in excess of 30 per cent per annum. See
Greene, ''Unlicensed and Licensed Usury in Utah, 4 Utah
Law Re\·iew 79; 55 Am Jur Usury, 6. Since this type of
legislation was designed as a shield to the borrower the
Court should not permit the usury statutes to be so con~'trued as to permit the lender to use the statute as a
s\\·ord. Rosp:gliosi v. Glenallen Min. Co., 69 U. 41, 47, 252
P. 276; Seebold V. Eustermann, 13 NW (2d) 739, 152 ALR
585; 40 Am Jur Pawnbrokers, etc. 8.
The question of whether the addition of attorney fees
to a loan renders the loan usurious has been litigated
throughout the United States, however the Utah Legislature has seen fit to expressly provide that in certain instances a provision for reasonable attorney fees may be
included in the contract. 15-1-2 (b), UCA, 1953. That
~tatute reads in part as follows:
MAXIMUM RATES.-The parties to any
contract may agree in writing for the payment of
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods or things in action, not to exceed ten per cent
per annum; proYided:
''15-1-2.
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(a) . . .
(b) That a loan may provide for reasonable collection costs and for a reasonable attorney's fee in the
event of default or delinquency."

Sub-paragraph (d) pertaining to small loan companies,
(e) pertaining to credit unions and (f) pertaining to industrial loan companies all provide that those organizations may contract for and receive interest and charge at
the rates specified in and subject to the limitations contained in the statutes regulating each type of organization. The wording used in sub-paragraphs (d), (e), and
(f) clearly indicates that reference in that statute to loans
made by such organizations were included in that statute
as exceptions to the rules pertaining to other loans, particularly with respect to rates of interest to be charged
and the addition of attorney fees, collection costs or other
charges.
Sub-paragraph (d) of 15-1-2, UCA, 1953, pertaining to
small loan companies refers to the small loan act Title 78,
Chapter 10, UCA, 1953 which provides in part in 78-10-13
(c), UCA, 1953, that:
" (c) In addition to the charges herein provided for,
no further or other a·mount whatsoever shall be directly or indirectly charged, contracted for, or received except as provided hereinafter . . ." (Emphasis added)
If sub-paragraph (b) pertaining to attorneys fees
were construed to permit a charge for attorney fees by
the organizations mentioned in sub-paragraphs (d), (e)
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and (f) it would be in direct conflict with the above
quoted section. The conclusion is inescapeable that subsection (b) of 15-1-2, UCA, 1953, does not confer the
power to charge attorneys fees upon the organizations described in sub-paragraph (d), (e) or (f) thereof.
Sub-paragraph (f) of 15-1-2, UCA, 1953, pertaining to
industrial loan corporations reads as follows:
That industrial loan corporations may contract
for and receive interest and charges at the rates and
subject to the limitations contained in chapter 8, Title
7, Utah Code Annotated 1953; ... " (Emphasis added)

"(f)

The express wording of said sub-paragraph (f) is that the
··charges·· which "industrial loan corporations may contract for and receive" is limited to those specified in the
industrial loan law, Title 7, Chapter 8, UCA, 1953. This
wording expressly excludes the power of an industrial
loan corporation to contract to "charge" attorney fees
under the provisions of 15-1-2, UCA, 1953.
The powers of an industrial loan corporation to contract for and receive the "interest" and "charges" referred
to in 15-1-2 (f), UCA, 1953, are enumerated in 7-8-3 UCA
'
'
1953, \\'hich provides in part as follows:

7-8-3. GENERAL POWERS.-Every industrial loan
corporation shall have power:
( 1)

( a) To lend money and contract for and receive

charges not exceeding the charges authorized
by paragraphs b, c, and d of this subsection
subject to compliance with all applicable pro-'
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VISions of this chapter. Every loan contract
made under this section may provide for repayment in a single payment or in installment payments. Charges may be added to the principal
of the loan and included in the face of the loan
contract.
Sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) mentioned
above provide in part as follows:
(b) To charge interest ... at the rate of one per
cent per month ...
(c) To charge a fee of $2.00 ... or $20.00
in examining and investigating the character
and circumstances of the borrower.
I

I

•

(d) To refund unearned interest or discount ...
As indicated above, an industrial loan corporation cannot "contract for" or receive charges" in excess of those
authorized by sub-paragraphs (b) pertaining to the rate
of interest to be charged, and (c) pertaining to an investigation fee which may be charged and are required
in paragraph (d) to refund unearned interest in the event
of pre-payment of the loan. Clearly the inclusion of a
provision in the note for payment of attorney fees in the
event of default is to "contract for'' "charges" which are
not authorized by any of said sub-paragraphs of 7-8-3,
UCA, 1953, and to permit the plaintiff to collect attorney
fees is to permit it to "receive charges'' in excess of those
authorized and which are not authorized by said subparagraphs. If the legislature had intended to permit industrial loan corporations to collect attorney fees they
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would have listed attorney fees with the other detailed
and itemized charges which are permitted.
In addition to the foregoing powers 7-8-4, UCA, 1953,
l:onfers upon industrial loan corporations "the general
powers conferred upon corporations by the Utah Business
Corporation act, ... except as otherwise provided herein."
The general powers of corporations conferred upon plaintiff by this section does not entitle plaintiff to collect attorney fees on its loans. To the contrary, that statute
l"xpressly makes an exception and does not confer general
corporation powers upon plaintiff which are in conflict
with the provisions of the industrial loan act. The only
"charges'' which can be contracted for or received by an
industrial loan corporation are spelled out in 7-8-3, UCA,
1953, and accordingly any general corporation power
\\'hich might tend to confer upon plaintiff the right to
collect attorney fees on its loans would be excluded by
the exception contained in 7-8-4, UCA, 1953.
It is a general principal of law concerning construction
of statutes that where the statute mentions one or a series
of things, that the menion of those specific items implies
the exclusion of other things not mentioned. The Latin
term ''Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" is applied
to this general principal of law. Zuniga v. Evans, 87 U.
198, 48 P. (2d) 513, 101 ALR 532; UniveTsity of Utah v.
Richards, 20 U. 457, 59 P. 96, 77 Am St. Rep. 928; Nelden
l'. Clark, 20 U. 382, 59 P. 524, 77 Am St. Rep 917, 50 Am
Jur Statutes 238. This rule applies even though there are
no negative words excluding the things not mentioned.
In Re Peterson, 42 NW2d 59. 18 ALR 2d 910; 50 Am Jur
StJtutes 238-239.
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The legislature has seen fit to permit plaintiff to charge
a rate of interest vastly in excess of that which may be
charged by others. To read into the statute a right to
make charges for attorney fees when the legislature has
maticulously defined what may be charged by plaintiff
and has stated that no other charges can be contracted for
or received would be to read into the statute something
which is not there. The state owes a duty to protect the
unfortunate victim of rapacity so far as it is practicable,
just as clearly as it does to protect the ignorant and the
unwary from the machinations of the confidence man or
the extortion of the highwayman. See 69 ALR 585, s. 125
ALR 743.
After the answer and counterclaim (R. 7-9) had been
filed the parties entered into a stipulation (R. 13-14)
wherein they agreed the only issue before the court was
the question of whether attorney fees could be charged by
an industrial loan corporation, plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment (R. 11-12) which came on for hearing
before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, District Judge,
who denied plaintiff's motion (R. 16) after hearing oral
argument by the respective counsel and considering the
written memorandum submitted by plaintiff in support
thereof. This order (R. 16) was a holding by Judge
Jeppson that plaintiff could not legally charge attorney
fees on an industrial loan. Defendant then made a motion
for summary judgment (R. 19-20) based upon that ruling,
however Judge Jeppson declined to consider that motion
(R. 27-30) because plaintiff had filed a notice of readiness
for trial ( R. 36) before that motion was heard, and accordingly defendant's motion was referred to the pre-trial
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judge, the Honorable A. H. Ellett, who in effect reversed
the decision of the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson concerning the right of the plaintiff to collect attorney fees and
awarded judgment in favor of plaintiff. Since two judges
of the same district have ruled exactly opposite on the
sa1ne question it is obvious that some confusion exists as
to the status of the law and that this question should be
l'h1rified. We feel that Judge Jeppson ruled properly on
this question and that the ruling of Judge Ellett should
be reversed. Defendant has paid the loan in full including
the interest claimed by plaintiff (R. 13-14) and should be
entitled to recover back the excess interest paid plus
triple damages and attorneys fees in accordance with the
provisions of 15-1-7, UCA, 1953, in the event that the
Court determines that the note is usurious, or in the alternative, should be entitled to an order adjudging that
defendant is not liable to plaintiff for attorney fees or
costs by reason of his tender (R. 10) and payment (R. 13)
a~ provided by Rule 68 (a) and related rules.
CONCLUSION

Judge Jeppson properly rules that the plaintiff as
an industrial loan corporation was not entitled to recover
attorney fees since the statute enumerating the "charges"
\vhich could be made by an industrial loan corporation
excludes the right to make or receive any other additional
charges and no provision is made therein for charging the
defendant with attorney fees. Judge Ellett erred when
he reYer~ed the decision of Judge Jeppson and held by
granting judgment for plaintiff at the pre-trial that an
industrial loan corporation can charge and collect attorney fees. The wording of 7-8-3, UCA, 1953, which gives an
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industrial loan corporation power: "To lend money and
contract and receive charges not exceeding the charges
authorized by paragraphs b, c, and of this subsection ..."
is controlling as to the "charges" which may be "contratced" for or "received" by the plaintiff. Since those
sub-sections do not permit plaintiff to "charge" an attorney fee it is clear that plaintiff has no power to either
"contract" for or to "receive" an attorney fee from plaintiff, and the inclusion of an attorney fee provision in the
note renders the note usurious.
Respectfully submitted,

RONALD C. BARKER

Attorney for Defendant and Appellant.
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